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In this paper, I will discuss several difficulties raised by 
Aristotle's notion of justice as a virtue of character. I will then 
examine solutions to these difficulties as proposed by David 
Bostock, Bernard Williams, and Howard J. Curzer. I will conclude 
by arguing for my own solution, which is an attempt to improve 
upon Aristotle's doctrines by synthesizing and expanding upon 
the best aspects of the solutions put forward by the aforementioned 
scholars. 
The basic tenets of Aristotle's ethics are familiar enough; there-
fore, a brief summary, mostly for the purpose of raising various 
issues, should suffice. According to Aristotle, a virtue is a state of 
character2 which is a mean between extremes. 3 The mean in ques-
tion is not a mathematical mean 4 but rather an appropriate amount, 
at the appropriate times, in the appropriate circumstances, in the 
appropriate manner, etc. 5 The two extremes on either side of this 
mean, one of excess and one of deficiency, are the corresponding 
vices. 6 
The discussion thus far naturally raises the question: a mean 
and extremes of what? There are at least two reasonable ways to 
interpret Aristotle's view on this. On one interpretation, the mean 
and extremes lie within a range of possible emotional responses. 7 
In some cases, this range appears to involve only one such emo-
tion. For example, temperance 8 is the mean of desire for pleasures 
of touch and taste which lies between the excess of self-indul-
gence and the deficiency of insensibility. In other cases, it appears 
to involve multiple inter-related emotions. For example, courage 9 
is the mean of fear and confidence which lies between cowardice, 
which is excessive fear and / or deficient confidence; and foolhard-
iness, which is deficient fear and / or excessive confidence. 
David Bostock raises an interesting question regarding the 
virtues and vices and their related emotions: Are all the virtues-
vice sets necessarily related to a particular emotion or pair of in-
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ter-related emotions, or can a single virtue-vice set involve emo-
tions in a more general manner? For example, need honesty and 
its corresponding vices be associated with a particular emotion, or 
could the vice of dishonesty involve fear, pride, greed, lust, or any 
other number of emotions? 1 0 
For the moment, I will leave these questions unanswered. How-
ever, they should be borne in mind, as they will prove relevant 
when we discuss possible solutions, including one of Bostock's, 
to the various puzzles raised by justice as a virtue of character, 
especially with regard to its particular motivation, if indeed it has 
one. 
Returning to means and extremes, another reasonable inter-
pretation posits that, for at least some of the virtue-vice sets, the 
mean and extremes lie not within a range of emotional responses, 
but rather within a range of possible actions. 1 1 For example, gen-
erosity is the mean between giving too much (extravagance) and 
giving too little (stinginess). Virtues involve acting appropriately, 
and may or may not be associated with the emotions at all, much 
less any particular emotion or inter-related pair of emotions. 
This interpretation raises some questions of its own. On this 
view, is the mean still a state of character? If so, what sort of state 
of character would it be? Would it be a disposition to act virtu-
ously? If this is the case, then doesn't Aristotle's theory suffer 
from problems of circularity or incompleteness? Would an objec-
tive, determinate action-guiding principle of generosity (for ex-
ample) be required in order to break the circle or complete the 
theory? 
If it isn't already obvious from the blatant rhetorical force of 
the above paragraph, I 'm personally not inclined to endorse this 
interpretation. However, I must admit that does have at least a 
little merit, especially when considering virtues such as generos-
ity and honesty. This interpretation is held to some extent by 
Bostock, and so will also prove especially relevant to our discus-
sion of his proposed solution to the difficulties raised by Aristotle's 
notion of justice as a virtue. However, in this case too I would like 
to leave these questions unanswered for now, asking the reader to 
keep them in mind, as they will be relevant when we do reach our 
later discussion of various solutions to the problems with justice. 
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Let us return to our summary of the virtues. On Aristotle's 
account, each virtue is specified as narrowly as possible. For ex-
ample, courage only concerns fear and confidence with regard to 
death in battle. Strictly speaking, courage does not involve fear or 
confidence regarding poverty, though these might be relevant to 
the virtue of generosity and its corresponding vices. Nor does cour-
age involve fear or confidence regarding political dishonor, though 
these might be relevant to the virtue of proper ambition and its 
corresponding vices. 1 2 These species of fear, and others like them, 
may be similar or analogous to courage, but are more properly 
ascribed to other virtue-vice sets such as the ones I've mentioned. 
In any case, Aristotle makes it clear that we should treat the vir-
tues as narrowly as possible. 
Now, at last, we turn to justice itself. Aristotle clearly treats 
justice as one virtue along side the others, at least in some sense. 
Consider the initial paragraphs of book five of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, which clearly imply that we should discuss justice in the 
same manner as the preceding discussions of the virtues of char-
acter. However, justice doesn't always fit the pattern of the virtues 
of character described above. 
Some of these tensions are resolved once we recall the dis-
tinction between general (a.k.a. universal) justice and specific 
(a.k.a. particular) justice. According to Bostock, Aristotle's dis-
tinction between general and specific justice is meant to capture 
the ambiguity of the Greek terms dikaios and adikos. Aristotle's 
general sense of these terms is similar to our general usage of the 
words "right" and "wrong," especially insofar as we use these terms 
to characterize and evaluate our other-regarding actions. Aristotle's 
specific sense of these terms is similar to our words "just" and 
"unjust." 1 3 
Thus, Aristotle uses general justice to refer to complete virtue 
in relation to other people, 1 4 where we simply mean the rightness 
of the virtues of character such as generosity, courage, etc., and 
the actions which flow from them, insofar as they involve others 
within our social-political context. General justice as a virtue of 
character is consistent with the doctrine of the mean and provides 
no serious difficulties to this doctrine, since general justice is simply 
a second-order virtue; that is, it supervenes on the other-regarding 
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aspects of the other virtues of character. It does not require its own 
distinct domain of emotions, motives, goods, etc., since it borrows 
them from the relevant first-order virtues of character, and it 
involves a mean in the same manner as those first-order virtues. 
Therefore, general justice is no more troublesome to Aristotle's 
conception of the virtues of character or the doctrine of the mean 
than the first-order virtues upon which it supervenes. 
So then it is specific justice which Aristotle takes to be an-
other one of the first-order virtues of character. But what then is 
the domain of emotions, motives, goods, etc., over which specific 
justice reigns? Aristotle's own account is sketchy: 
• Specific justice is concerned with goods of fortune with in-
trinsic worth but not necessarily good for the particular per-
son who has them. 1 5 These goods include honor, money, and 
safety; 1 6 that is, divisible social-political goods. 1 7 
• Acts which violate our objective notions of specific justice 
may occur as the result of a variety of motives or vices, but 
the motive properly associated with specific justice as a vice 
of character is pleonexia.16 
• Pleonexia involves wanting more; for example, more of the 
amount of goods distributed; or, if one is not a recipient of 
the goods distributed but is involved in the distribution pro-
cess somehow (say, as a judge), more of the gratitude of the 
recipients or "to exact a penalty." 1 9 
• Specific justice involves a mean between acting unjustly and 
being treated unjustly.2 0 
• Specific justice is a different sort of mean than the means of 
the other virtues of character, in that it aims at the mean. 2 1 
Here are just a few of the many possible difficulties raised by 
the above statements: 
• Aristotle only gives us one vice (pleonexia) not two, there-
fore the doctrine of the mean is violated. 
• Aristotle only characterizes specific justice negatively, via 
specific injustice and pleonexia. Specific justice does not 
have any positive content and is therefore not a substantial 
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mean, as with the other first-order virtues of character. Thus, 
specific justice does not fit Aristotle's general scheme for 
the virtues of character nor the doctrine of the mean. 
• Since each virtue-vice set involves its own unique motiva-
tion, the motives involved in specific justice cannot overlap 
with those of any other virtue-vice set, such as generosity. 
However, this seems absurd, since common sense tells us 
that the same motive (for example, monetary greed) could 
be behind both stinginess and specific injustice (for example, 
unfairly distributing wealth). 
• On a related note, pleonexia might be the motive behind 
many instances of specific injustice but isn't necessarily so; 
for example, apathy or mischief might also motivate one to 
distribute goods unjustly. 
• Also, pleonexia does not appear to be its own distinct emo-
tion or motive, but rather a general term for a class of emo-
tions such as monetary greed, over-ambition, etc. Thus 
specific justice does not have its own distinct emotion, and 
therefore is not a distinct first-order virtue of character. 
• Aristotle's claim that specific justice involves a mean be-
tween acting unjustly and being treated unjustly 2 2 is obvi-
ously a weak attempt to force specific justice into the 
constraints of the doctrine of the mean, especially since its 
not clear that being treated unjustly could be a vice. 2 3 
There are a variety of possible solutions to such difficulties, a 
few of which we will now consider: 
One possible solution is simply to deny that specific justice is 
a virtue of character. We might claim that Aristotle was wrong to 
say so, and is then forced to resort to several artificial arguments 
and claims in order to force specific justice into his model for the 
virtues of character and the doctrine of the mean. Instead, we should 
simply let general justice be the unproblematic second-order vir-
tue of character and treat specific justice as an independent politi-
cal principle for legislation and lawful action, which ultimately 
coheres better with his discussion of specific justice in distribu-
tion, rectification, exchange. 
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However, this solution is inadequate. It is contrary to com-
mon-sense moral intuitions that people can express the character 
traits of justice and injustice, and in more than a mere second-
order way. Aristotle takes great pains to make his theories com-
patible with common-sense morality insofar as possible, so this 
solution would be a bit of a philosophical cop-out. 
Another possible solution notes that specific justice does not 
fit the pattern of the typical virtues of character, for many of the 
reasons above. However, some of the virtues of character them-
selves do not fit the model for the virtues of character. Though it's 
true that some virtue-vice sets (for example, temperance and cour-
age, and their associated vices) are associated with a single emo-
tion or pair of inter-related emotions, others are related to the 
emotions in a more general way (for example, honesty and spe-
cific justice). Therefore, Aristotle should actually have three classes 
of virtues instead of two: virtues associated with a particular emo-
tion, virtues associated with the emotions in a more general way, 
and virtues associated with reason (that is, the intellectual virtues). 
The account of the virtues which Aristotle gives, including the 
doctrine of the mean, is more or less sufficient for the virtues as-
sociated with particular emotions, but he needs to come up with a 
different account for the virtues associated with emotions more 
generally, just as he gives a different account for the intellectual 
virtues. Aristotle himself probably recognizes this in his discus-
sion of specific justice and the difficulties which he himself raises. 2 4 
I 'm more sympathetic to this solution than the first. I think it's 
on the right track, especially since it does appear that specific jus-
tice needs a somewhat different account than virtues such as cour-
age or generosity, for all the reasons we've already discussed. 
However, I believe it's possible to go further than this, and give an 
account which brings specific justice at least somewhat more in 
line with the more typical virtues of character, as we shall see. 
Another possible solution, one put forward by Bernard Will-
iams, is to flatly deny that specific justice fits the pattern of the 
other virtues of character and the doctrine of the mean. First of all, 
Aristotle gives us only one vice, not two. Also, Aristotle is just 
plain wrong to claim that pleonexia is necessarily associated with 
every instance of specific injustice. Furthermore, pleonexia is not 
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a distinct emotion, but at best a non-technical term used to refer to 
a whole class of relevant emotions. However, specific justice can 
be characterized by the motive to justice itself. Unlike the other 
virtues, where the objects are money, honor, etc., and the person is 
called virtuous insofar as they are disposed towards these objects 
appropriately, specific justice itself can serve as the object of the 
just person's actions and deliberations. The virtue of justice is sim-
ply a disposition to act justly, which in this case is not circular or 
incomplete, since Aristotle goes on to give an independent account 
of specific justice in terms of distribution, rectification, exchange, 
and the principles behind each. The disposition to justice involves 
resisting any of a whole class of motives which would otherwise 
steer one away from justice (for example, monetary greed, over-
ambition, etc.), which Aristotle carelessly refers to as pleonexia, 
though it could in fact involve other non-"greedy" motives. 2 5 
I believe that this solution takes us one step closer to the best 
possible solution, but does not take us all the way. I more or less 
agree with William's characterization of the motives behind jus-
tice and injustice, and his take on pleonexia. However, Curzer also 
gives some interesting suggestions which not only provide a no-
tion of specific injustice more consistent with the doctrine of the 
mean, but also provides a more positive and substantial account of 
specific justice and injustice, as well as pleonexia. 
According to Curzer, Aristotle gives or at least implies a fuller 
account of specific justice which does fit the model of the virtues 
of character and the doctrine of the mean. Specific justice (and its 
associated vices), like courage (and its associated vices), actually 
involves two inter-related ranges of emotion. The first emotional 
range has the excess of pleonexia (the illicit desire for goods qua 
unjustly distributed / undeserved), the implied 2 6 deficiency of 
meionexia (the masochistic desire for less than one deserves), and 
a mean (the desire for goods qua all and only what one deserves). 
Aristotle's account is further completed if we bring in his notion 
of nemesis, the mean desire for others to get what they deserve 
(opposed to the vices of spite and envy). 2 7 
In my considered opinion, Curzer comes closest to the correct 
solution to the problems of specific justice as a virtue. I especially 
like the form of Curzer's account, wherein there are two inter-
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related motives, one self-regarding, one other-regarding. However, 
I 'd prefer to use something more like William's characterization 
of the content of the motive behind justice. Then we get a virtue of 
specific justice which involves, at least in part, an appropriate de-
sire for justice, both for one's self and more generally, and it is 
possible to go wrong either in excess or deficiency with regard to 
either. A few examples of each: 
Excess regarding self: wanting more of the socially-distrib-
uted goods than one deserves; so pettily pursuing what one is owed 
that one fails to take into account other morally relevant consider-
ations. 
Deficiency regarding self: not pursuing what one justly de-
serves; not sticking up for one's self. 
Excess regarding others: vengeance; vigilantism. 
Deficiency regarding others: distributing goods unfairly from 
mere apathy or frivolity. 
In this way, we have a positive notion of the virtue specific 
justice and the two corresponding vices of specific injustice with 
distinct objects and motivations which cohere with the doctrine of 
the mean and which preserve our moral intuitions regarding the 
proper ascription of just or unjust to a person's character and mo-
tives. Though this isn't exactly Aristotle, it's an improvement which 
I think he himself would have appreciated. 
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